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Abstract 
This paper explores the extent to which current reforms of the euro-zone’s governance 
remain encased in the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty - the narrowness of its underlying 
paradigm;  the gaps and imbalances of its design – and the implications for the future of the 
euro.  With a model of ‘sound money, sound finances’, based on the precepts of German 
ordo-liberalism, a vulnerability was exposed: it lacked the instruments, not only to aid, but 
also to police.  This was exacerbated by the shallowness of public legitimation, ignored from 
the outset. The uncertainty, delays and division displayed by the euro-zone’s response to the 
crisis owed much to the ‘lock-in’ of Maastricht.   The paper includes a critical reassessment of 
Dyson and Featherstone (1999). 
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Le choc de la nouvelle?   
Maastricht, déjà vu and EMU reform 
 
Introduction  
The governance of the euro-zone undoubtedly faces its biggest challenge in 
the context of the on-going debt crisis.  At its heart is the strategic issue of 
how to manage a heterogeneous group of economies and states.  This 
involves rule-setting and compliance, but it also raises a more complex 
agenda of cross-national solidarity and the ability of European Union 
institutions to intercede domestically to steer and uphold necessary 
adjustments.  Indeed, the two bailouts for Greece in 2010-2012 questioned the 
ability of the EU to micro-manage domestic structural reform.  Much attention 
has been paid to the crisis by economists, but these are issues which are very 
much in the territory of political science.  The aim of this paper is to establish 
how current reform efforts remain encased in the constraints of the Maastricht 
Treaty - the narrowness of its underlying paradigm; and, the gaps and 
imbalances of its design – and the implications for the future of the euro.  In 
essence, the questions come down to matters of foresight and policy learning, 
as well as of path dependency and lock-in. 
The Maastricht constraint has reinforced the EU’s tendency to economic 
orthodoxy in other cases.  .As Lütz and Kranke (2010: 15) observed, in their 
study of Hungary, Latvia and Romania, ‘the EU’s recent lending policies 
amount to a European rescue of the Washington Consensus.  While the IMF 
has—at least in part—relaxed its formerly tight stance on economic 
conditionality attached to its loans, the EU has actively promoted orthodox 
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measures in return for loans to those countries that are designated to join the 
single currency area and hence have to meet certain economic criteria’. 
The importance of the euro to the EU means that there are wider implications 
drawn from the effectiveness and nature of its policies and governance.  The 
confrontation in Greece between the reforms encouraged by the ‘Troika’ and 
the domestic resistance to the costs of austerity poses unprecedented 
questions about European integration – its norms, processes and purposes – 
and its reliance on a foundation of popular legitimacy. ‘Europe’, previously 
synonymous with modernisation, progress and economic gains, was now 
associated with a level of austerity not known in recent peace-time.  At the 
same time, the EU was being drawn into a process of monitoring, supervision 
and conditionality – penetrating the domestic state administration via a 
seemingly permanent ‘Troika’ office in Athens – that risked clashes of cultural 
frames and of acceptability.  From a starting-point of limiting euro-zone level 
domestic intervention in the name of governments building their own 
stability cultures, ‘Europe’ had been dragged into a highly fraught political 
contest, questioning its ability to manage the process. 
The agenda advanced by the Troika in the context of the bailouts owes much 
to previous IMF actions in states in crisis, but it also shows the extent to which 
the euro-zone remains ‘locked-in’ to the normative underpinnings of the 
Maastricht Treaty agreed in December 1991.  In order to establish this 
constraint and its current implications, this paper will: 
• Clarify the notions of path dependency and ‘lock-in’ to be applied here; 
• Re-examine the expectations and assumptions prevalent in the 
Maastricht negotiations – with some critical self-reflection on the 
account given in Dyson and Featherstone (1999). 
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• Consider the fragility of the Maastricht construct in the context of the 
limits of any parallel political integration. 
• Outline the failure to escape from the Maastricht principles as the euro-
crisis took hold in 2010-11. 
• Assess the implications for the immediate future of the euro-zone. 
 
Bargaining, lock-in and inefficiency 
In a basic sense a treaty like that of Maastricht is intended to create enduring 
commitments, to tie the signatories in to a set of rules and mutual obligations.  
But the claim developed here goes further.   
Path dependency can be a glib reference and it needs careful application 
(Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Pierson: 2000).  In its strongest form, path 
dependence (in historical institutionalism) contradicts the neo-classical 
economic model of consistently rational behaviour leading to efficient and 
predictable outcomes.  At issue, is the extent to which errors were made at the 
point of the original agreement and how far these were knowable and 
avoidable. This is what Liebowitz and Margolis, in their severe (rationalist) 
challenge to the field, refer to as ‘Third-degree path dependence’.  Thus, it is 
not merely that the original decision appears inefficient in retrospect – their 
‘Second-degree path dependence’ – but that at the initial point there were 
alternatives and the knowledge to avoid a regrettable outcome.  They judge 
the likelihood of such conditions existing to be very low.  But, as Pierson 
(2000: 256-7) points out, politics differs from economics: there is even less 
reason to assume anything like a market mechanism will be self-correcting 
and the institutional setting matters. 
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The ‘Third-degree path dependence’ is a bold proposition: the study of 
bargaining processes, like that leading to Maastricht, can assume voluntary 
decisions by ‘utlity-maximisers’ (the assumptions of rational choice).  The 
frame of historical institutionalism, however – and the interpretation of pre-
Maastricht bargaining offered in Dyson and Featherstone (1999) – emphasises 
the structuring of choices and decisions over time, with distinctive ‘paths’ of 
rationality that may be sub-optimal for some negotiating parties and for the 
collective outcome. Learning itself is path dependent: an actor’s 
understandings are filtered by existing mental maps (Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 
1999). 
For some writers, path dependence is predicated on ‘increasing returns’ or 
positive feedback processes over time, though others are not so restrictive. 
The notion refers to how the costs of switching from one alternative path to 
another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time.  In the 
case of EMU, a resistance to change can be readily identified over the last 
decade.  This may be attributed to a set of policy beliefs being sustained over 
time that gave primacy to monetary stability, a desire to build-up the 
credibility of the original Treaty provisions, and recognition that a shift would 
impose disproportionate costs on the pivotal partner, Germany.  The latter 
was and is clearly crucial to the maintenance of the system and was also the 
progenitor of the principles underpinning the original design.  Even when a 
systemic shock occurred in 2009-10, with the Greek debt crisis, the steer 
remained tied to the original course.  
So, what exactly was being ‘locked-in’ (Arthur, 1989) after Maastricht?  The 
following sections will justify a claim of lock-in to a paradigm of ‘sound 
money, sound finances’ and one based on an ordo-liberal belief of 
responsibility being held at the level of national governments.  This same 
paradigm curtailed the options considered for reform of euro-zone provisions 
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in response to the systemic shock.  Indeed, it served to re-define the content of 
‘economic governance when the notion reappeared in political debate.  In 
sum, the prime discourse remained one of penalties and tightened regulation 
for governments not abiding by the rules set by Maastricht – to better 
overcome the ‘moral hazard’ they posed to the original construct – rather than 
a return to the Keynesian-inspired ideas of the Werner Report on EMU of 
1970, for example. 
 
The ‘lock-in’ of Maastricht 
For Keynesians, the Werner Report of 1970 – also concerned with outlining 
the requirements of EMU - appeared intellectually superior to the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty1.  The latter had referred to the need for a ‘centre of 
decision for economic policy’, with powers to coordinate fiscal policy and 
issues of investment and consumption, infrastructure, and policy 
coordination to address the need for growth and employment.  The Report 
foresaw a fiscal transfer system to provide ‘automatic stabilisers’ and a 
coordinated investment programme to help states in difficulty.   
In the Inter-Governmental Conference negotiations, the Commission had 
promoted some Neo-Keynesian ideas: its own paper of May 1990 had 
advocated that the European Council should formulate ‘economic policy 
guidelines’ and Delors himself had shown support for a structure of 
‘economic governance’ at the EU level, though he avoided using the term 
directly. Delors would associate himself with the need for collective 
bargaining and an industrial policy at the EU level.  His experience at the 
French Planning Commission (1962-69) had left its mark. The French Finance 
                                                        
1 This section draws on Dyson and Featherstone (1999).  The research for this book involved 
some 175 personal interviews and extensive archival searches. 
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Minister, Pierre Beregovoy, had been the first to talk of the need for a 
‘political pole’ to balance the ‘monetary pole’ of EMU in the lead-up to 
Maastricht.  The Elysee later termed the notion 'un gouvernement 
économique’.  Indeed, President Mitterrand equated economic governance 
with a strengthening of the European Council in a speech in October 1990.  
The idea became the most distinctive and overriding theme of the French 
negotiating position prior to Maastricht.  It reflected the intellectual influence 
of Social Catholic and Social Radical traditions of economic policy.  ‘Economic 
governance’ was a key part of Beregovoy’s paper to the IGC of 5 December 
1990.  Its rationale was based on the need for a democratic legitimation of 
EMU, but also of the risks of a divergence between monetary and budgetary 
policy.  There would be the need to prevent excessive deficits and to apply 
sanctions: a matter on which France took the lead in the IGC.  It figured in the 
French Draft Treaty on EMU of 5 January 1991. 
Be that as it may, references to ‘economic governance’ shocked the German 
Finance Ministry and the Bundesbank.  Instead, its own dominant paradigm 
was of ‘sound money’ and the precepts of Ordo-liberalism.  This entailed 
priority to disinflation; budgetary discipline; and currency stability, 
underscored by the vital importance of the credibility of policies within the 
financial markets (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 2).  Indeed, the re-launch of 
the EMU debate in 1988 had owed much to a confluence of support for the 
‘sound money’ approach amongst EC central bank governors and the EC 
Monetary Committee, alongside Germany.  This consensus was a response to 
what were seen as the policy failures of the 1970s and of France, in particular, 
in 1981-83.  In political science terms, an epistemic community had emerged 
of shared normative and causal beliefs that would be credible in the financial 
markets and this helped to forge the unanimity of the Delors Committee in its 
report on EMU in 1989.  A new primacy was given to monetary policy 
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instruments and price stability was seen as the priority objective (McNamara, 
1988; Marcussen; 1998).  Not only would it not jeopardise other objectives, 
like growth and employment; it was a necessary condition for their long-term 
attainment.  Thus, the EMU negotiations gave little attention to any euro-level 
responsibility for stabilising aggregate demand and the avoidance of negative 
demand shocks.  This agenda had been discredited with the demise of 
Keynesianism.  There would merely be ‘soft’ law processes applied to the 
coordination and monitoring of national fiscal policies and borrowing levels 
under the ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ and, after 1997, the ‘Stability & 
Growth Pact’. 
Structural changes also served to advance the new policy consensus.  The 
success of the European Monetary System (EMS) in the late 1980s reinforced 
such ideas.  This, together with the onset of the single European market, was 
seen as essential preconditions that had not existed at the time of the Werner 
Report and they proved influential in Bundesbank thinking.  The growth and 
impact of capital mobility (under the single market) had itself shifted the 
debate.  The free movement of capital facilitated the disciplinary effects of the 
financial markets on national budgets and was seen as efficient in the 
allocation of resources.  The financial services sector gained in political 
influence and facilitated the ascendancy of the ‘sound money’ paradigm.  
Alongside these shifts was some optimism with respect to the general macro-
economic climate – growth across the EMS had been relatively high for the 
previous four years – and the ‘feel-good’ factor promoted a sense of 
inclusiveness.   
There were also institutional sensitivities at play.  The failure to address fiscal 
policy issues prior to Maastricht was, in part, the result of an unwillingness to 
cede political autonomy over such matters to the EU level.  The risks inherent 
in an heterogeneous monetary union were to be left for adjustment at the 
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national level.  Ordo-liberalism advocated that a stability culture – matching 
sound money with sound finances – could only be developed ‘bottom-up’ – 
that is, from the domestic level – and it could not be imported from outside or 
‘faked’.  It might also be added that the convergence criteria for entry into the 
‘euro’ could serve as a means of importing discipline from outside for reform 
advocates at the domestic level (Carli, 1993). Thus, there were philosophical 
reasons to deny competence for fiscal management at the EU level. 
In the years after Maastricht, conditions changed but the policy regime, with 
very minor exceptions, did not.  The Italian economic performance looked 
promising and the government of Constantine Mitsotakis in Greece was 
embarked on a dash for qualification, based on an over-confidence in the 
speed of domestic adjustment.  The Maastricht negotiators had – in the main – 
not expected all member states to join the convoy of euro-entrants at the 
outset, but the political imperative ebbed.  When it came to judging whether 
the entry conditions had been met, there was a shared interest in fudging or 
massaging the tests.  In particular, debt levels above the required 60% of GDP 
were set aside. 
Thus, the Maastricht Treaty had bequeathed: 
• A rejection of EU institutional competence not only to coordinate and 
set economic policy for the euro-area, but also to delve, police and 
adequately punish national governments deviating from the 
convergence rules.  The ‘moral hazard’ of governments manipulating 
the data and of sustaining uncompetitive paths was not addressed 
properly. 
• An expectation that the euro-zone would not be fully inclusive at the 
outset, but a shift of political interest that made it difficult to block all 
but Greece – and her only temporarily. 
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• An assumption that heterogeneity and asymmetric shocks could be 
handled by the disciplinary power of the financial markets, 
strengthened by the rules on no bailouts (Art.125) and the ‘excessive 
deficit procedure’ (Art. 104) for lax national governments. 
• A belief that matters of demand management did not belong to the EU 
level and, given the failures of Keynesianism, national governments 
were best served by priority to monetary stability (sound money) as 
the necessary policy regime for growth in the long-term. 
The Maastricht provisions comprised contradictions and gaps.  On the one 
hand, the strictures were of no bail-outs, the importance of abiding by the 
rules, and sanctions for those that do not.  Solidarity was to be created by the 
imposition of penalties, though the democratic underpinnings of EMU 
governance were minimal.  There would be no facility to expel errant member 
states nor would the latter have a specified legal right of exit.  When faced 
with a deep economic crisis – inevitably eliciting strong political and social 
reactions - what would happen with states unable to deliver compliance?  
Immediately after Maastricht the disciplinary rules were already appearing 
unenforceable (Buiter et al, 1993: 58, 90). 
In Dyson and Featherstone (1999), we charted the ideational, institutional, 
and strategic underpinnings of the ‘road’ to Maastricht.  Inevitably, in trying 
to examine the negotiations from the ‘inside’, there was a risk of absorbing the 
instinctive assumptions of the key actors involved.  Thus, in the light of the 
recent debt crisis, we were not explicit enough in accounting for the progress 
of the ‘no bail out’ rule.  We considered it in the context of preference-
formation in different national contexts – especially Germany – but it seemed 
so inevitable and essentially uncontested that we chose not to highlight it as a 
theme in the index.  Perhaps more acutely, we gave insufficient attention in 
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our conclusions – as, indeed, had the negotiators themselves – to the 
implications of the heterogeneity of national politics and administrative 
systems with respect to the ability to abide by the rules set.  The issue was one 
of a different kind of asymmetric ‘shock’: the incapacity to implement reforms 
and accept fiscal rules consistent with the Treaty.  In a sense, the neglect was 
strange: how could negotiators not be sensitive to the risks of striking deals 
with politicians like Guilo Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, for example – an 
embodiment of a ‘partitocrazia’ known for its fiscal laxity?  Other member 
states had sustained high debt to GDP ratios for a long period: Greece and 
Belgium, being two such instances.  How could they be expected to deliver 
‘sound finances’? 
The answer we gave was that these limitations accrued from the Maastricht 
negotiations being set as a politically-isolated, narrow ‘core executive’ activity 
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 746-7).  A ‘technically rational outcome on 
EMU’ had been negotiated ‘free from the complexities of political-union 
negotiations’ leaving ‘some critical gaps’ (1999:747).  We did not specify the 
problem of divergent system capabilities, norms or logics as one such gap.  
Instead, we highlighted the political exposure of the ECB – without a location 
within a political union framework – and a ‘potentially highly problematic 
relationship between rulers and ruled’ (1999: 747).  Both were relevant to the 
subsequent history of EMU, but were incomplete as an account of the political 
risks. 
More generally, the Maastricht set of rules, the philosophy and its 
assumptions would be very severely tested by the unprecedented growth of 
capital mobility over the euro’s first decade.  In fairness, the international 
economy had changed since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992: ‘credit 
default swaps’ had then been  unknown, the credit rating agencies had barely 
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entered the European market2, and sub-prime mortgages were not on the 
radar screen.  No-one foresaw the collapse of major Wall Street institutions 
like Lehman Brothers in September 2008 nor the ferocity of the gathering 
credit crunch.  Thus, the euro’s own failing regime and the wider structural 
changes in the international capital markets served to create a combustible set 
of conditions. 
 
The Limits of Political Integration 
The Maastricht agreement on EMU was left vulnerable by the absence of 
economic governance, but also by the risks with respect to cross-national 
solidarity.  It was clear that, ‘The fundamental point remained that the 
German model failed to offer an adequate basis for a sustainable EMU’, a 
‘new sense of solidarity that would support ‘burden-sharing’ within EMU’ 
was likely to prove elusive, as ‘EMU’s Achilles’ heel was the prospect of 
people being asked to make sacrifices for others with whom there was a weak 
sense of identity’ (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 796).  Even in the EMU 
negotiations, German representatives had displayed, ‘a deep-seated mistrust 
that began with the Greeks and ranged through Italy, Spain, and Belgium to 
include France’ (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 372).   
Moreover, well before the credit crunch and the debt crisis, the surveys of 
‘Eurobarometer’ published on behalf of the EU Commission showed a set of 
distinctly un-‘communautaire’ dispositions.   Amongst the EU27 member 
states, only 16% of voters’ equated Europe with ‘tolerance’ and an alarmingly 
low level of 13% thought it synonymous with ‘solidarity’ (Eurobarometer, 69, 
November 2008).  More generally, in 1999 at the birth of the euro currency, 
                                                        
2 Before the 1990s, the three main credit rating agencies – Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, and 
Moody’s –  had few, if any, analysts outside US. 
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‘trust’ in the EU averaged 40% marginally ahead of the 39% who had no trust 
in the EU.  After six decades of the European integration process, such results 
suggested a surprising shallowness of its impact on contemporary attitudes.  
While some 60% equated Europe with ‘peace’ – something of an historical 
reference point – the absence of solidaristic attitudes of relevance to current 
issues was not a strong base on which to face asymmetric economic shocks as 
Europe was soon to face. 
The survey results were consistent with a number of academic studies 
exploring the roots and contours of European identity.  In his study of public 
attitudes, Fligstein (2008) saw Europe as a transnational society, but one that 
was shallow.  The extent and depth of cross-national interaction was limited 
to a minority.  He identified a variation across three social groups.  The most 
pro-European were the young, the educated, the professional, and the 
business sections of the electorate.  The most fearful of Europe tended to be 
the older, poorer, and less-educated voters.  In-between was a middle class 
‘swing’ constituency, which sometimes saw itself as being ‘European’.  Unlike 
national identity, Europe lacked a cross-class attachment or appeal (see also 
Bruter, 2003).  Again, the picture painted suggests vulnerability for the 
European project at a time of economic crisis.  
The debt crisis when it arose could not easily be equated with a traditional 
left-right political cleavage across Europe.  It was more a post-modern 
disaster for the EU.  The crisis elicited responses that reinforced national 
stereotypes and antagonisms.  Societies turned insular when faced with 
economic demands.  The popular media in Germany was critical of lazy, 
protected and overpaid Greeks.  In 2010, the Bild newspaper suggested that 
the government in Athens should sell-off a few Aegean islands to raise funds 
or to turn the Acropolis into a theme-park, for example.  In response, the 
Greek media rekindled attacks on Germany for not having paid sufficient war 
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reparations and for being hypocritical given that in 1953 it had benefitted 
from (in real terms) a much bigger debt write-off.  The British media found in 
the euro-crisis confirmation of its deeply-rooted euro-scepticism.  The EU was 
being divided almost along a north-south divide; in any event, there was little 
popular base for a common solidarity in response to the crisis. 
 
The failure to escape from Maastricht 
The financial crisis that spread across the international system in late 2008 
was exceptional in both its form and its environment. The sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the US quickly had contagious effects.  The latter were 
gauged by the three dominant credit rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s – based in the US that constituted ‘governance without 
government’ (Sinclair, 1994). Their power over sovereign states would be 
displayed in Europe where they downgraded the sovereign bonds of Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain.   Fitch’s downgrading of Greek bonds on 8 
December 2009 and Standard and Poor’s determination of them being of ‘junk 
status’ on 27 April 2010 were particularly consequential for the financing 
position of Athens.  As earlier with their reaction to the Far East crisis and US 
mortgages, the agencies were attacked for their poor forecasting and the pro-
cyclical impacts of their announcements.  A new debate was prompted in 
Europe as to their oligopolistic power leading to the question of whether 
Europe should foster its own agency. 
In the changed international environment, the EU response showed 
uncertainty, but also much division and delay.  The collapse of Lehman 
Brothers saw national governments hang loose and the EU Commission 
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struggled to establish a leadership role for itself3.  A body of commentary 
soon identified this pattern of diverse responses as being prompted by 
structural deficiencies in the governance of the euro-zone.  The institutional 
arrangements lacked the capacity for a speedy reaction to events, policy 
discretion was constrained, and the ability to act centrally was limited (Pisani-
Ferry and Sapir, 2009; De Grauwe, 2010). 
Faced with the emerging sovereign debt crisis in Greece in the last months of 
2009, the EU hesitated.  The first reaction was to do nothing and to shift the 
responsibility – consistent with the German Ordo-liberal view – back to the 
domestic level.  The following February, the Council [under Art. 126(9) TFEU] 
required Greece to cut its deficit and to correct its divergences thereby 
‘removing the risk of jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU’ (16.2.10). 
Soon afterwards there were press reports of EU governments pressing Greece 
to double the cuts it had announced thus far.  The next stage saw the 
Commission monitoring the Greek situation.  Its stance was more supportive: 
it confirmed that Greece was abiding by the Council’s instructions 
[COM(2010)91] and that its budget measures were on course ( 9.3.10).  But the 
bond spreads Greece faced in the markets were signalling that Athens would 
need a financial rescue.  A third chapter saw EU leaders in the European 
Council at the end of March finally agreeing that there could be a rescue deal 
– with funding shared one third from the IMF, two thirds from EU 
governments – but it would only come about if all member states agreed and 
if all other options had been exhausted (26.3.10).  If a bailout did happen, 
Greek finances and progress would be monitored on a quarterly basis to 
check that a set of conditions – highlighting targets and reform objectives – 
were being met.  The Papandreou Government had attempted to protect its 
                                                        
3 The Commission did promote its European Economic Recovery Plan in 2008 in response to 
Lehman.  See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0800:FIN:EN:HTML  and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_European_Union_stimulus_plan  
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position by denying it would need a rescue, but one month after the European 
Council agreed the principle the PM announced that Greece did need to 
activate the loan that had been envisaged (23.4.10).  Tensions rose both in the 
markets and on the streets of Athens, as protesters feared the austerity 
conditions to be imposed.  George Papakonstantinou, as Finance Minister, 
told the Greek Parliament in a debate to back a bail-out that: 
 “In less than two weeks, a 9 billion-euro bond comes due and the 
state coffers don’t have this money…As we speak today the country 
can’t borrow it from foreign markets and the only way to avoid 
bankruptcy and a halt on payments is to get this money from our 
European partners and the IMF.” [5.5.10] 
A game of brinkmanship was evident: the Greek government needed to give 
signals to both its domestic audience, but also to its euro-zone partners.  Even 
then, the final chapter in the first rescue had not been closed: it took a further 
nine days before EU finance ministers sanctioned the loan.  The package was 
set at €110bn with strict conditions.  The uncertainty and delay in the EU 
acting undoubtedly had driven up the ‘ante’ needed to have credibility to 
convince the international financial markets that the euro-zone would stand 
by one of its members.   
Chancellor Merkel in Germany had felt under much domestic pressure to be 
tough on Greece.  In the first months of 2010 she had waited for difficult state 
elections in North-Rhine Westphalia to be completed.  She also had to take 
account of the German Constitutional Court’s previous decisions on the legal 
conditions under which the Deutschemark had been abandoned for the euro 
which stressed the need for the new currency to be based on stable, 
disciplined monetary policies.  German public opinion reacted badly to the 
idea of bailing-out Greece, given domestic news reports of Greeks being paid 
pensions too early and not working long enough.  An ordo-liberal instinct 
eschewed rescuing a state and a society living beyond its means.  Yet, 
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ultimately, the governments of Germany and France, in particular, had been 
faced with the stark choice: bailout Greece or bailout your own banks.  A 
default in Athens at that time would have had a devastating financial effect 
on the domestic banking systems elsewhere in Europe. 
But with the loan, the euro-zone had entered new territory: for the first time, 
the EU and the IMF would engage in extensive monitoring and tough 
conditionality vis-à-vis the fiscal management and economic policy of one of 
its member states. A semi-permanent ‘Troika’ Office was set-up in Athens to 
police the actions of the state administration.  Regular meetings with 
ministers and officials were established, with teams sent into ministries to 
investigate procedures and examine ‘the books’.  Later, in September 2011, the 
Troika was flanked by a ‘Task Force’ of the EU Commission, created to help 
the administration in Athens to identify and absorb more of the structural 
funds of the EU.  Never before had a member state’s administration been so 
penetrated by the EU.  The combined monitoring was a major challenge for 
the EU’s reach and capability, as well as for the recipient bureaucracy 
floundering in its own weaknesses and lethargy.  It involved a difficult clash 
of attitudes and cultures between the two ‘sides’: young, assertive middle-
ranking officials from Brussels grilled senior (elected) politicians used to some 
deference. It was an unknown process that both parties had to work out. 
The problems of the Greek state adjusting speedily enough and meeting the 
tough conditions became evident in spring 2011 as Athens missed the agreed 
targets.  Crucially, it experienced a shortfall in the tax revenue it was raising 
and the Troika warned it might not be able to sanction the next loan 
instalment.  The tensions in the euro-zone were spreading to other states: the 
fear of contagion was prominent.  By July 2011, EU leaders had faced the 
inevitable and had agreed that a second Greek bailout would be needed.  The 
new loan was set at €109 billion, it would come with a lower interest 
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repayment rate and a longer period in which to pay it back (fifteen years).  
Merkel insisted that there should be a new element in this loan: the banks that 
had lent recklessly to Greece should suffer a hit.  ‘Private sector involvement’ 
(PSI) would mean they took a ‘haircut’, forced to accept they would get less of 
their money back.  At the same time, EU leaders agreed that the ‘European 
Financial Stability Fund’ (EFSF) they had sanctioned the year before with 
some €750 billion of funding would be superseded by a larger ‘European 
Stability Mechanism’ (ESM), with a greater leeway in how it could be utilised.  
The funds – and their increase – were a recognition that the problems of the 
euro-zone were no longer confined to Greece and that a bigger war chest was 
needed to assure the survival of the euro in the face of the market onslaught.  
Bailouts had earlier been agreed for Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal 
(May 2011). 
But the July agreement began to unravel over the summer.  Finland led an 
initiative to insist that the Greek government should provide collateral for the 
new loans, the Slovakian Parliament seemed that it might not agree the 
second bailout, and the political climate in Austria was also very antagonistic. 
The political clashes and uncertainty increased the speculation on a Greek 
default.  The Commission denied it was preparing for such an eventuality, 
though German ministers said it could not be ruled out.  By October 2011, the 
EU had edged further towards a second rescue deal but it awaited further 
assurances from Greece.  A European Council meeting scheduled for mid-
October was put back by a week.  When it met on 23 October, a package for 
Greece involving a €100bn-euro loan, a 50% (PSI) debt write-off, and more 
austerity measures in Greece was negotiated.  New uncertainty was 
immediately introduced, however, by the surprise announcement a week 
later by Premier George Papandreou that he would ask for a referendum to be 
called in order to win public backing for the package.  His announcement 
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shocked and angered President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, as it 
introduced a new conditionality into the protracted deal, and they invited 
him to emergency talks in Cannes just ahead of the G20 summit.  
Diplomatically, Papandreou was seen as having been humiliated at those 
talks.  The reaction to the referendum idea within Greece was, if anything, 
even more hostile.  The leader of the main opposition party, Antonis Samaras 
of New Democracy, had refused to say that he would support the deal that 
had been so long in coming.  Parliamentarians within Papandreou’s PASOK 
(the socialist party) and across the parties saw it as a gun to their heads – 
forced to accept the severe economic measures – and as too risky: the voters 
might put in jeopardy not only Greece’s membership of the euro-zone, but 
also of the EU.  Five days after Papandreou had made his surprise 
announcement, he told Parliament that he had agreed to step-down and a 
new coalition government would be formed.  At least, he could claim that the 
referendum initiative had forced Samaras to declare that he would support 
the second bail-out.  Lucas Papademos, a former Vice President of the ECB, 
became PM of a caretaker government established to implement the 
immediate measures required before the bailout would be sanctioned. 
Significantly, the leaders of Greece’s two main parties were required to sign 
written undertakings to the EU Commission that if their parties were in 
government after the upcoming elections they would abide by the terms of 
the planned deal. 
Greece’s financial position had worsened during the long delay in securing 
the second bailout.  Eventually, Eurozone finance ministers agreed (21.2.12) a 
€130 billion package (co-funded by the IMF and EU governments), which 
involved further unpopular budget cuts and a bigger PSI ‘haircut’.   Holders 
of Greek government bonds were pushed to accept losses of around 74% on 
the value of their investments.  The arrangement was intended to reduce 
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Greece’s public debt by more than €100 billion.  The pressure remained on 
Greece.  Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, told the European 
Parliament in April 2012 that further measures would be needed in Greece 
after the looming national elections on 6 May.  Fiscal retrenchment should 
prioritise expenditure cuts, rather than further tax rises.  A quick 
recapitalisation of Greek banks should be concluded by September 2012, in 
order to facilitate banks’ loans to small and medium enterprises.  In order to 
restore cost-competitiveness, nominal unit labour costs in the private sector 
should be lowered by 15% in the 2012-2014 period.  A set of liberalisation 
measures to improve competitiveness in the Greek economy was listed.  
Military expenditures – and the potential to buy hardware from France and 
Germany – was, by contrast, not to be cut.  This aside, it was clear that the 
second bailout was to be underscored by stronger pressure on, and 
monitoring of, Greece.  There was rescue-fatigue on the part of Greece’s 
partners. 
Altogether, the 2012 package constituted the biggest sovereign debt 
restructuring in history.  The Commission’s own estimates of the support 
given to Greece put it at some €380 billion, equal to 177% of the Greek GDP, 
or €33.600 for each Greek inhabitant (Euractiv, 18.4.12).  The sum included 
loans, write-downs on loans and EU funds delivered to Greece since the 
beginning of the debt crisis.  The Commission compared this to the Marshall 
Plan after 1947 which had involved transfers equal to around 2.1% of the GDP 
of recipient countries. This was somewhat disingenuous as the economic 
conditions between the two periods were very different, as were the impacts 
of the Greek austerity measures.  The two bailouts resolved Greece's 
immediate financing needs, but the first and even the second were very 
unlikely in themselves to revive the domestic economy, which had already 
been in recession for five consecutive years. 
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The sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal – and fears of them 
spreading to Italy and Spain, which soon proved valid – provoked a new 
debate on euro-zone governance.  Not only had the EMU set-up been found 
wanting, its institutions had also been obliged to act in ways other than the 
expected manner.  The bailouts themselves had been crafted in a way so as to 
circumvent the Treaty commitments: it was euro-zone governments, not the 
EU or the ECB that contributed the two-thirds funding alongside the IMF.  At 
the same time, the European Central Bank had been forced to innovate in its 
support for governments and the banking systems.  The ECB had been 
established to be even more independent than the Bundesbank, but now its 
actions seemed to some to be more comprising politically and to be leaning 
towards the monetisation of deficits. 
A patchwork quilt of measures was initiated.  The ESM was close to Sarkozy’s 
preference for a European Monetary Fund.  The ESM would be able to help 
euro-zone states before they needed long-term aid and would be able to 
recapitalise banks through loans to governments.  But the ESM could only act 
after EU unanimity. In late 2010, the EU Commission proposed six legislative 
acts to reform EMU governance.  What was soon dubbed its ‘Six Pack’ 
involved strengthening the automaticity of sanctions on errant governments; 
the possibility of the EU imposing non-interest bearing deposits leading to a 
fine on member governments; stronger Commission monitoring of debts and 
deficits; a Commission scorecard of macro-economic imbalances; and the 
establishment of consistent, clear reporting rules for national governments.  In 
parallel, the EU Council President, Herman van Rompuy, delivered a report 
on further reforms in October 2010.  Each was seen as correcting the gaps left 
by Maastricht.   
Even Chancellor Merkel now used the term ‘economic governance’, alongside 
President Sarkozy at press conferences.  But, in reality, they were largely re-
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defining the term.  An economic ‘pole’ may be being established, but its 
character was of the stronger imposition of rules and the easier sanctioning of 
penalties to enforce compliance to ‘sound money, sound finances’ across 
national governments – pressing them to live up to the obligations foreseen at 
Maastricht.  In other words, it was more of the same, but with a new title: it 
was not a paradigmatic shift.  Indeed, the frame lacked the institutional 
underpinning of economic governance (Wyplosz, 2010). It was not clear 
whether the new fines would be viable in practice, given likely domestic 
challenges to their legitimacy.  Nor was it clear how the ex ante validation of 
national budgets, during what the Commission saw as a budget ‘semester’, 
would work – especially in the face of a strong domestic political challenge 
behind a deviant package.  
A new ‘Fiscal Pact’ was agreed at a European Council meeting on 2 March 
2012 and signed by 25 of the 27 member governments4.  David Cameron 
replicated John Major’s stance at Maastricht by refusing to sign it – indeed, he 
had blocked the initiative to have it as a new EU Treaty at a similar summit 
on 8-9 December 2011 – and he was joined by the Czech Government. The 
new intergovernmental Pact, formally entitled the ‘Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance’, faced a ratification process within each 
signatory state.  In Ireland a referendum was called, a vote that was won with 
some 60% supporting ratification.  The intention was for the new Pact to take 
effect at the start of 2013 if at least 12 states had ratified it. 
The Pact sought to sanctify the debt and deficit rules.  The relevant extracts 
are given in Fig. 1.  Art. 3(ii) committed member states to put into their 
national laws or constitutions that such provisions be an obligation and that a 
‘correction mechanism’ for deviations be established.  Art. 4 made it a 
requirement that national debt be kept within 60% of GDP.   Art. 8(ii) allowed 
                                                        
4 It had been agreed in principle at a European Council meeting on 31 January 2012. 
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for one government to challenge the fiscal position of another before the 
Court and the latter could impose a lump sum payment or fine.  The closer 
economic coordination of Art. 11 was designated as a shared learning process, 
but it also posed a common constraint on the options available. 
Fig. 1  Key Fiscal Pact Provisions: extracts 
Article 3 (i) [on debt and deficit rules]:    
(a) the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party 
shall be balanced or in surplus; 
(b) the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual 
structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-
term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower 
limit of a structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market 
prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their 
respective medium-term objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be 
proposed by the European Commission taking into consideration country-
specific sustainability risks. Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term 
objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the 
structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of 
discretionary revenue measures, in line with the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
Art. 8(ii) provided for penalties and fines: 
Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of the European Commission, a 
Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred 
to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request 
the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the 
European Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. If the Court of Justice finds that the 
Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose 
on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that 
shall not exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a 
Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European 
Stability Mechanism. 
Art. 11 provided for closer economic policy coordination: 
the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they 
plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated 
among themselves. Such coordination shall involve the institutions of the 
European Union as required by European Union law. 
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More radical reforms did not appear on the negotiating table in the on-going 
European debate. A number of economists argued for the creation of common 
euro-bonds, to share the debt and bolster its financing with the credibility of 
the stronger economies. To criticisms that this would not help with ‘moral 
hazard’ problems, the Bruegel think tank in Brussels proposed two types of 
euro-bonds – one for those governments with debt above 60% of their GDP, 
the other for those with lower debts.  Sharing national debts, however, 
fundamentally clashed with the ordo-liberal tradition and German opposition 
made such options off limits.  Bigger EU budget transfers – as proposed in the 
MacDougall Report of 1977 and paralleling the adjustment mechanisms of 
other federal systems – were also not considered. 
Throughout the debt crisis, the EU kept faith with the Maastricht model on 
EMU.  Far more than in 1991, the German government was able to set the 
terms and impose its leadership.  President Sarkozy ceded more ground than 
had Mitterrand and was less assertive in the cause of economic governance, 
the most distinctive French position in the 1991 negotiations.  The Fiscal Pact – 
overwhelmingly Chancellor Merkel’s initiative - establishes the debt and 
deficit rules on the strongest legal basis, recalibrating the values set at 
Maastricht to make the policy constraint tighter. 
 
Conclusions 
It is evident that the model of governance established for EMU in the 
Maastricht Treaty rested on a paradigm of ‘sound money, sound finances’ 
with its origins in German ordo-liberalism.  From that base, the model became 
vulnerable in the face of a crisis: it lacked the instruments and capability of 
economic governance – to police, but also to aid.  This risk was exacerbated 
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by the shallowness of public legitimation – seen in attitudes towards 
solidarity, trust, tolerance – that would be needed if re-balancing actions were 
to be taken. The EU’s response to the emergence of the euro-crisis – its 
uncertainty, division and delays – showed the extent to which it remained 
locked-in to the Maastricht frame.  Even the new Fiscal Pact remains 
consistent with those provisions, recalibrating and toughening-up the rules.  
There is a new rhetoric of ‘economic governance’ – redefined since 1990 – and 
a mechanism by which governments should consult their partners, ex ante, on 
any domestic reform initiatives, but this is a provision free of budget transfers 
and simply facilitates mutual surveillance.  The euro-zone is not breaking-free 
of the Maastricht legacy. 
A path dependence akin to what Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) termed 
‘Third Degree’ is evident: at the initial point of decision: alternatives were 
rejected (due to Germany’s lead) that were accepted as more efficient by 
others (France, in particular) and the outcome proved sub-optimal for all, 
especially as the set course was maintained for too long in the light of the new 
conditions, increasing the adjustment costs. 
The path risks an iteration of financial crises – in debt exposure and banking 
system viability – as ‘rescued’ states are left on a path of austerity and a slow 
return to growth.  Few expect the second Greek bailout to prevent a further 
re-structuring crisis.   
The issues of governance and of solidarity remain to be addressed. The euro-
zone has to deal with the risks of heterogeneity, not only of economic 
performance but of political system: of the weaknesses of domestic state 
administrations to oversee reform, of social dissensus blocking reform 
agendas.  The euro-zone is now committed to a long-term domestic oversight 
function in Athens: its capabilities are being stretched like never before.  
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Economically, the calls for a shift of emphasis towards growth, rather than 
internal devaluation policies, are set to be much stronger.  The intellectual 
debate has shifted, along with public attitudes.  The survival of the euro may 
well depend on the EU adopting a more fulsome economic governance, 
drawing on neo-Keynesian demand management and mutual support.  If not, 
the euro may face retreat: a split in the euro-zone or a smaller bloc.  The 
flagship policy of the EU – the euro – carries with it much baggage.  If the fate 
of the European project is left exposed to the narrow paradigm of Maastricht, 
supported by IMF orthodoxy, it may be seriously undermined. 
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